Requirements / Identification and Authentication (IA)
IA.L2-3.5.3
Multifactor Authentication
Official Source Material
Use multifactor authentication for local and network access to privileged accounts and for network access to non-privileged accounts.
Determine if:
- [a] privileged accounts are identified;
- [b] multifactor authentication is implemented for local access to privileged accounts;
- [c] multifactor authentication is implemented for network access to privileged accounts; and
- [d] multifactor authentication is implemented for network access to non-privileged accounts.
Source: CMMC Assessment Guide - Level 2, Version 2.13, September 2024
Practitioner Guidance
How to meet it
Network access includes your office LAN. Get the definitions right before you scope anything.
The assessment guide defines local access as access obtained by direct connection without the use of networks, and network access as access obtained through network connections. A user signing into a domain workstation at a desk is network access. MFA (multifactor authentication) on the VPN and on Microsoft 365 while plain passwords open everything on the internal network is the classic failure of objective [d].
Objective [a] is a list you write before touching any technology.
Identify every privileged account: domain and Microsoft Entra ID administrator roles, firewall and switch administration, hypervisor and backup consoles, and your managed service provider's accounts in your environment. Privileged accounts then need MFA everywhere, including local access under [b]. Non-privileged accounts need it for network access under [d].
Factors are something you know, have, or are. Device attributes are not factors.
A compliant device, an allowed IP range, a MAC address, or a location is a policy condition, not a second factor. An authenticator app, a FIDO2 key, a smart card, or a time-based code is. Conditional Access policies in Microsoft Entra ID enforce MFA. They are not themselves MFA.
Password fallback quietly deletes your MFA.
Windows Hello for Business with a TPM (the trusted platform module chip) plus PIN or biometric is a defensible two-factor implementation, but only when enforced. If a user can pick other sign-in options and get in with just the password, the control is optional, and demonstrating your sign-in flow is a standard assessment step. Enforce the strong path and be ready to show both factors in use.
Local access to privileged accounts is the objective people forget.
Objective [b] covers the administrator at the console. An OS-level MFA agent on servers and admin workstations covers it directly. Vaulted credentials cover it another way. When the local administrator password sits in LAPS, Microsoft's Local Administrator Password Solution, or in a privileged access vault that itself demands MFA, retrieving the credential requires the second factor.
Phones do not need MFA to unlock. They need it to reach your systems.
The assessment guide states that multifactor authentication is not required for access to mobile devices such as smartphones or tablets. The session the phone opens to your email or files is network access to your system and prompts like any other client.
The scoring rule gives partial credit here and removes the deferral path.
32 CFR 170.24 subtracts three points when MFA covers only remote and privileged users, and five when it covers no one. This is one of only two Level 2 requirements scored with partial credit. A plan of action and milestones is the documented list of gaps you commit to close after assessment. Because the value exceeds one point either way, 32 CFR 170.21 keeps IA.L2-3.5.3 off a Conditional status plan. Finish it before assessment.
What falls short
- MFA on cloud email and the VPN only. Internal network sign-ins stay single factor, which leaves [d] unmet for every on-premises path.
- MFA prompted once at device enrollment or account setup. The objectives ask for MFA on access, not on setup.
- Windows Hello for Business configured but not enforced, with password sign-in still allowed. The second factor is optional, so [b], [c], and [d] rest on a control users can decline.
Edge cases
- Manufacturing equipment and other specialized assets that cannot do MFA are documented as an enduring exception with mitigations in the system security plan. 32 CFR 170.24 assesses enduring exceptions described that way as MET.
- Network gear with no native MFA support is covered by fronting management with an MFA-protected jump host or authentication service, or by vaulting the admin credential behind MFA.
- Switching to a second account mid-session is a new access. Signing into a privileged account from an MFA-authenticated standard session still takes the privileged account through its own factor.